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Abstract 
This paper investigates a rather neglected issue in the banking literature 
regarding the impact of large lending (LL) on the three banks’ performance aspects 
(cost, profit and productive). Possible influences may arise in the context of banks’ 
credit risk as trade credit, which is provided by large, creditworthy firms, and it is a 
method of monitoring and enforcing loan contracts to relatively riskier firms. Indeed, 
trade credit providers view payments beyond the discount period as a sign of financial 
difficulty while the option to cut off shipments for nonpayment is a potentially 
powerful means for a trade creditor to force repayment, especially if a supplier 
provides its costumer with a product that has no close substitutes. A unique dataset 
was constructed concerning all USA banks collected from SDI (Statistics on 
Depository Institutions) report compiled by FDIC (Federal Deposit Insurance 
Corporation). Our sample contains 7960 banks and tracked yearly for the period 2010 
-2017, creating an unbalanced panel of year observations. An econometric framework 
based on nested non-neutral frontiers, was developed to estimate the influence and the 
decomposition of large lending on the three banks' performance aspects (cost, profit 
and productive). Moreover, different types of frontiers aiming at the cost, profit, and 
production side have been investigated. The empirical findings reveal that the large 
lending plays a crucial role on banks' technical efficiency. Significant variations 
among different frontier models, type of bank and size, banks’ ownership structure 
and macroeconomic conditions appear to be present. By considering all CAMEL 
(Capital Adequacy Asset Quality Management Earnings Liquidity) parameters we 
notice that banks’ financial strength affects banks’ efficiency. Some policy 
implications are derived based on the empirical evidence supporting a safer and 
sounder banking system can be emerged as banks finance large firms, increasing the 
willingness of people to save and bank’s attitude to finance profitable investments 
projects that rise firm’s value and promote economic growth. 
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1. Introduction 
Trade credit remains the single largest source of short-term business credit in 
the United States and other nations around the world. The tendency of production 
firms to act as financial intermediaries—a role usually reserved for banks- has 
triggered the interest of policy makers and academics. The debate mainly focuses on 
(i) explanations that view trade credit as a method of monitoring and enforcing loan 
contracts to relatively risky firms, (ii) explanations in which a firm’s long-term supply  
relationship helps it to make better credit decisions than a bank would,(iii) the 
relationship between bank credit and trade credit, and (v) the availability of credit to 
small- and medium-sized enterprises from suppliers and banks. Another, equally 
important topic, is the effects of large lending (LL) on bank efficiency provided that 
trade credit is mainly offered by large and old firms that have access to external 
finance. This paper contributes to the literature discussing this theme. We examine 
whether large lending has positive or negative effects on bank efficiency. To the best 
of our knowledge, this is the first paper that provides empirical evidence on this 
policy relevant topic. This paper examines the impact of large lending on bank 
efficiency by using stochastic frontier analysis for a broad sample of 7960 commercial 
and savings banks in USA. It explores the issue by addressing four related questions: 
(i) What is the effect of large lending on bank inefficiency? (ii) Large lending could 
be used as an input in production function? (iii) Large lending could be used as an 
output in cost function? (iv) Large lending could be used as an output in profit 
function?. We will show that large lending has a positive effect on bank efficiency. 
More importantly, we provide empirical evidence for the hypothesis that large lending 
increases bank efficiency, the bank efficiency increasing effects of a rise in large 
lending are observed for the three efficiency aspects (product, cost and profit). In 
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addition, we find that large lending could be used as output in cost function but not in 
profit function. Particularly, banks can reduce their total cost as lending large firms 
banks can avoid the cost that stem from monitoring and enforcing loan contracts to 
relatively risky firm. Finally, the estimation results support that large lending could be 
an input in product function which means that trade credit and bank credit can be 
considered as complements implying that banks lend those firms that have received 
trade credit reducing at the same time banks’ credit risk. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In the next section we present 
the relevant literature review while in Section 3 we include the econometric 
methodology which will be followed. Section 4 we present the data used and the 
variables definition. Section 5 discusses the estimation results. Finally, Section 6 
concludes the paper. 
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2. Trade credit, large lending and efficiency: A brief literature 
overview 
 
The widespread use of trade credit as a source of funding in modern 
economies has been highlighted by a considerable number of scholars (Elliehausen 
and Wolken, 1993, Rajan and Zingales, 1995, Kohler et al, 2000, Atanasova and 
Wilson, 2002, Bartholdy and Mateus, 2008, Wu et al, 2011,). 
 For instance, Rajan and Zingales (1995) mention that trade credit (measure it 
by using account payable) reaches to 15% of total assets in 1991 for a large sample of 
non-financial firms, listed US firms.   
Moreover, trade credit is considered to be a very expensive means of external 
finance. Smith (1987) estimates an implicit interest rate of 44% per annum for those 
who do not take the discount which is 2% if costumers pay back within ten days, with 
net price charged for payments within 30 days.    
Also, a firm may raise capital from a multitude of sources. According to the 
Financial Hierarchy doctrine, firms seek external finance when they exhaust their 
internal funds which top the hierarchy as being the least costly (Myers 1984; Myers 
and Majluf 1984). 
Intuitively, bank loan is a cheaper source of funding compared to trade credit 
however bank loan procedure relates to credit risk as borrowers promise to lenders 
future uncertain payments which pay back the loan amount. Nevertheless, cash is 
relatively easy to divert from its intended purpose increasing the credit risk of a bank 
loan as these borrowed amounts are used to finance investments projects whose 
returns will repay the loan, instead under mounting financial pressure borrowers may 
use the loan for unprofitable purposes or fraud decreasing dramatically the likelihood 
of the repayment of loan (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2002). 
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Apart from large firms, banks lend SMEs, especially, in the development 
phase of their expansion, SMEs depend highly upon the banking sector to obtain 
funding (Boocock and Wahab, 2001). Although, large firms and SMEs create various 
positive externalities on economies and social benefit, because they make important 
contributions to investment, innovation, employment, and social stability (Carter and 
Jones-Evans, 2006 ; Edmiston, 2007), SMEs are thought as a group of firms for which 
informational asymmetries between lenders and borrowers are more pronounced due 
to their financial opacity (Berger and Udell, 1998), and therefore credit rationing is 
more likely to occur (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981. Thus, financing gaps exist in SMEs 
(Cassar, 2004; Howorth 2001; Wingborg and Landström, 2000) which make not only 
banks unwilling to lend this kind of firms but also banks face a higher credit risk 
compared to large firms when they lend this kind of firms (Cassar, 2004; Howorth, 
2001; Wingborg and Landstrom, 2000). 
 In addition, trade credit literature suggests that firms may extend credit to 
their customers for financial, operational, and commercial motives. In this section we 
review the implications of financial motives on bank efficiency. Borrowing goods 
instead of money permits firm to make a credible commitment not to divert the loan 
for unprofitable purposes. So, trade credit is a very important source of funding for 
those firms considered less creditworthy, especially when financial conditions are 
difficult and financial markets are tight (Burkart and Ellingsen, 2002). 
In other words, the presence of supplier - customer relationship determines  
trade credit as a powerful tool that improves monitoring and enforcement since 
supplier can cut off shipments for nonpayment while at the same time trade creditors 
concern about the long term health of their costumers which ensures more sales in the 
future (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic, 2001 ; Berlin, 
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2003).  Indeed, Smith (1987) shows that firms which sell products to other firms have 
a screening motive to find out the default risk of their buyers.  
Particularly, Smith (1987) supports that firms can manage nonsalvageables 
investments effectively if they have information about buyer's default risk. Therefore, 
he notices that selling firms can detect buyers' default risk offering cash discounts 
payments as buyers who do not exploit this opportunity might have experienced a 
deterioration in their creditworthiness. Therefore, selling firms, which offer trade 
credit, have more time to take steps in order to preserve nonsalvageables investments.   
In contrast to this, firms which claim net payments on cash do not have this 
opportunity. So, this kind of investments influences selling firms to use trade credit as 
a screening mechanism to acquire important information about buyer’s default risk.    
Similarly, trade credit providers view payments beyond the discount period as 
a sign of financial difficulty (Ng et al, 1999 ; Petersen and Rajan, 1994) while the 
option to cut off shipments for nonpayment is a potentially powerful means for a trade 
creditor to force repayment, especially if a supplier provides its costumer with a 
product that has no close substitutes (Berlin, 2003).  
Moreover, some scholars notice that larger and older firms typically have 
larger accounts receivable which means that they are large suppliers of trade credit 
(Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Berlin, 2003). Firm’s age and firm’s size reflect firm’s 
creditworthiness a crucial characteristic that determines who is more likely to extend 
trade credit as reasonably creditworthy firms have an advantage monitoring riskier 
firms, which are typically smaller and younger (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Nilsen, 
2002; Berlin, 2003).  
In addition, Schwartz (1974) developed the financial motives for the use of 
trade credit. He suggests that when credit is tight, financially stable firms will 
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increasingly offer more trade credit to maintain their relations with smaller customers, 
who are "rationed" from direct credit market participation. The seller firm acts as a 
financial intermediary to customers with limited access to capital markets, thus 
financing their customers' growth. Faulkender and Wang (2006), also observe that 
larger firms are thought to be better known and have better access to capital markets 
than smaller firms, in terms of availability and cost, and should therefore face fewer 
constraints when raising capital to finance their investments Hence, the financial 
motive predicts a positive connection between extending trade credit and firm size 
(Schwartz 1974; Petersen and Rajan 1997; Mian and Smith 1992). Consequently, 
according to financial motive we establish the following hypothesis: 
H1: Large lending affects positively bank efficiency  
We investigate this association focusing not only on the cost efficiency, which 
is the most famous dimension of bank efficiency (Silva et al 2017), but also on profit 
efficiency and production efficiency two other dimensions of bank efficiency which 
need more exploration as banks may be cope with cost inefficient through higher 
revenue generation (Sensarma, 2005). In addition, profit function includes the same 
exogenous variables with cost function (a vector of outputs and a vector of input 
prices) (Sensarma, 2005). 
Moreover, banks prefer to lend suppliers who extend trade credit to their 
customers (Berlin, 2003), ensuring their loans as suppliers have a monitoring and 
enforcing advantage over banks (Biais and Gollier, 1997). In addition, trade credit 
literature considers trade credit and bank credit as complements implying that banks 
lend those firms that have received trade credit (Cook, 1999; Omo, 2000; Love et al, 
2007; Cunningham, 2005) as trade credit may represent a positive signal for banks 
(Mariarosaria Agostino and Francesco Trivieri, 2014). Extending trade credit seller 
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faces the default risk of the buyer, which means that he has good information about 
the latter. Bank observes trade credit procedure and therefore it adjusts favorably its 
beliefs about the buyer deciding to lend him. In other words, bank credit rationing can 
be mitigated by the presence of trade credit as it permits the private information of the 
seller to be used in the lending relationship, (Biais and Gollier, 1997).Therefore, we 
create the below hypothesis: 
H2: Large lending could be used as an input in production function 
In addition, larger and older firms have easier access to external finance; they, 
in turn, act as intermediaries and extend trade credit to other, riskier firms (Petersen 
and Rajan, 1997). Therefore, suppliers are financial intermediaries which means that 
banks can avoid the cost that stem from monitoring and enforcing loan contracts to 
relatively risky firm (Berlin, 2003). Obviously, banks cannot avoid costs that are 
related with efforts needed to monitoring and enforcing loans contract to large firms 
which are the main source of trade credit. Thus, we test the next hypothesis: 
H3: Large lending could be used as an output in cost function 
Lastly, from a profit perspective, Stiglitz and Weiss, (1981) imply that banks’ 
profitability can be affected negatively by increased interest rate because of 
information asymmetries issues that arise during bank loan procedure. Indeed, an 
increase in interest rate in credit markets where lenders are not able to distinguish bad 
borrowers from good borrowers, persuade low quality borrowers to apply for loans as 
they face higher probabilities of default on their loans and therefore, they are harmed 
less than good borrowers in case of an increase in interest rates. In other words, 
lenders are keen to offer low interest rates so as to create a less risky bank loan 
portfolio (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981). 
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   In addition, increased interest rates tend to diminish borrower’s stake in the 
project while at the same time under limited liability borrowers are not harmed by a 
rise in interest rates when borrowers are declared insolvent. This moral hazard 
justification implies that this contraction in borrowers’ profits convince them to 
undertake projects with high private benefits, or to abandon the initial project in favor 
of alternative activities, or get involved in fraud. Thus, the likelihood of compensation 
is negatively influenced by reduced performance (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981).So, we 
test the next hypothesis 
 H4: Large lending could be used as an output in profit function 
To investigate the above hypotheses, this research employs stochastic frontier 
analysis (SFA)1 examining the uncertain relationship between the extent of large 
leanding and the three different aspect of efficiency of USA banks. Based on Battese 
and Coelli (1995), we implement the maximum likelihood estimation method to 
simultaneously estimate the stochastic function and the inefficient model. Moreover, 
exploring the above hypothesis we contribute to the bank efficiency literature review 
which focus mainly lie in   ownership structure (Bonin et al., 2005; Lensink et al., 
2008; Berger et al., 2009), mergers and acquisitions (Lee et al., 2013; Montgomery et 
al., 2014) regulatory and supervisory measures on bank efficiency (Barth et al., 2010; 
Chortareas et al., 2012), and corporate governance on bank efficiency (Aebi et al., 
2012; Beltratti and Stulz, 2012). 
 
 
 
 
1
 We use stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) rather than data envelopment analysis (DEA). The main 
advantage of SFA over DEA is that it allows us to distinguish between inefficiency and other stochastic 
shocks in the estimation of efficiency scores (Yildirim and Philippatos, 2007)  
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3. Methodological Issues 
The most prominent and influential approach to firms’ productive performance 
measurement is relied on the estimation of a parametric or non-parametric production 
frontier, which directly links productive efficiency notion to the notion of productive 
efficiency as it was introduced, by Farell’s seminal paper (1957). The popularity of 
the production frontiers approach to the productive performance measurement is 
mainly established on the grounds of its ability to decompose the overall productive 
efficiency in components, which are mainly oriented either to the production mix 
itself, either to exogenous factors which are accounted as productive inefficiency 
factors.  In addition, it is not worthless to mention that the approach of the parametric, 
which include the so-called stochastic, production and cost frontiers, allows us to test 
the hypothesis that (i) the LL function affects the kernel of the frontier and thus are 
treated, in econometric terms, as an “additional input” in the production process or (ii) 
they are simply exogenous factors that may affect, in every possible direction, the 
firms’ productive efficiency. Of course, both of the aforementioned hypotheses may 
not be accepted and thus no impact of LL on firm’s productive performance is 
identified.  
 
3.1. LL affects the Frontier 
Following Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000, p.262) let ( )1,..., 0Nx x  be an input 
vector used to produce scalar output 0y  . The stochastic production frontier may be 
written as:  
                         ( )ln ln ; ,     1,..., ,    1,...,it it ity f v u i I t T= + − = =itx β                         (1) 
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where i indexes banks, t indexes time, ( )ln ;f itx β is the deterministic kernel of the 
stochastic production frontier ( )ln ; itf v+  itx β , ( )2~  0,i vv iid N   captures the effect 
of random noise on the production process,  ( )2~ 0,i uu N  captures the effect of 
technical inefficiency and β  is the parameter vector to be estimated. Hereafter the 
subscript t  is suppressed and fixed effects panel data models are employed for 
simplicity reasons. Battese and Coelli (1992) show that the best predictor of the 
technical efficiency of each producer is ˆexp( )i iTE u= − , where ( )( )ˆi i i iu E u v u= − . In 
the above described model, the so-called Error Component Model (ECM), LL may 
influence the productive performance through their inclusion in the input mix. Such 
being the case, LL are econometrically treated as an additional input, and the 
corresponding stochastic production frontier can be written as: 
                                  ( )ln ln , ; , ,     1,...,i LL LL i iy f x v u i I= + − =ix β β                       (2) 
 
where LLx is the employed LL which operates as a shifter of the deterministic part of 
the production frontier, LLβ  is the vector of the additional parameters to be estimated 
and captures the alteration of the position and shape and the production frontier due to  
the inclusion of LLx .  
 
3.2. LL as Inefficiency Factors 
In the next step we consider the case where a vector of exogenous variables 
( )1,..., Qz z influences the structure of the production process by which inputs x  is 
converted to output y . The elements of z capture features of the environment in 
which the production takes place, and they are generally considered to be conditioning 
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variables beyond the control of those who manage the production process. In this 
case, as Huang and Liu (1994) proposed, the stochastic production frontier of 
equation (1) is accompanied by the technical inefficiency relationship  
                                            ( );i iu g = +iz δ                                                   (3) 
where δ is a vector of parameters which are associated to inefficiency factors, to be 
estimated. The requirement that ( ); 0i iu g = +   iz δ is met by truncating i  from 
below such that ( )iz ;δi g  − , and by assigning a distribution to i  such 
that ( )2~ 0,i N   . This allows 0i   but enforces 0iu  . In the case in which the g  
function is a linear one, the above model is the so-called Technical Efficiency Effects 
Model (TEEM) which was introduced by Batesee and Coelli (1995). The technical 
efficiency of the thi− bank is given by    exp expi iTE u = − = − −iδ'z .  In this 
paper we test the hypothesis that the LL may have the character of a z variable which 
we name it LLz , and thus relationship (3) becomes:  
                                                      ( ); ; ;i LL LL iu g = +iz z δ δ                                        (4) 
where LLδ are the additional parameters which have to be estimated since the LL have 
been included among the other inefficiency factors. According to equation (4) LL do 
not influence the structure of the production frontier, but they do influence the 
technical efficiency with which banks approach the production frontier.  
 
3.3. LL as an Input and an Inefficiency Factor 
In order to test the hypothesis that LL affects the production process through 
both the position and shape of the production frontier and the inefficiency term, 
equations (2) and (4) should be combined and the following model arises:  
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( )
( )
ln ln ; ;
        ; ; ;
i LL LL i i
i LL LL i
y f v u
u g 
= + −
= +
i ;
i
x x β β
z z δ δ                                 (5) 
 
The essential novelty of the Huang and Liu (1994) approach is that the 
function ( );g iz δ is allowed to include interactions between exogenous factors iz and 
production inputs ix  (Batesse and Broca, 1997). The incorporation of non-neutral 
effects of LL in the production performance can be realized either through the 
consideration of LL as a factor that affects the production frontier itself, or through 
the consideration of LL as a technical efficiency factor. In the former case, the 
( );g iz δ  function for the thi− bank can be written as: 
  ( ), , ; , ln lnQ Q QNLLi LL q qi qn qi i LLq q LL
q q n q
g x z z x z x  = + +  i ni qiz x δ δ            (6) 
The last term of the right-hand part of equation (6) depicts the non-neutral 
effects of the LL on the inefficiency terms when they affect productive performance 
through the kernel of the stochastic production frontier. In the case where LL are 
considered an inefficiency factor exhibiting non-neutral effects, the ( );g iz δ  function 
for the thi− bank can be written as: 
          ( ), , ; , ln lnQ Q N NLL LL q qi LL LL qn qi ni nLL LLi ni
q q n n
g z z z x z x   = + + +  i i iz z x δ δ   (7) 
 
The last term of the right-hand part of the above equation depicts the non-
neutral effects of the LL on the inefficiency terms when LL are an inefficiency factor. 
The total effect of LL on the technical inefficiency of the thi− bank is the sum of the 
second and fourth term of the right-hand part of the above equation. Of course, 
combining equations (6) and (7) we can explore the case where non-neutral effects 
arise from both the LL as a factor that affects the production frontier as well as from 
LL as an inefficiency factor. Thus, the multifaceted character of LL, as regards 
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productive performance, may be based, in econometric terms, on the non-neutral 
effects that our model allows for.  
In the current paper the production frontier of the banks is assumed to be 
described by the following translog functional form which is associated, through the 
inefficiency factor v  to a linear inefficiency model. That is, we consider the following 
production frontier for the i th−  bank with subscript t suppressed: 
                             
0
2
1ln ln ln ln
2
1
         ln  
2
i n ni nm ni mi T
n n m
TT Tn ni i i
n
y x x x T
T T x u v
   
 
= + + + +
+ + + −
 

               (8) 
 
where , , , , ,n m L l E D LL=  denote , labor, liabilities, total equity,  deposits,  and LL 
inputs respectively, while T is a time variable which captures technical change. The 
symmetry condition requires    ,nm mnb b n m=  . As mentioned above in this paper, we 
consider the case whether LL affects productive performance through their inclusion 
in the input mix. In other words, the LL alters the position and the shape of the 
frontier itself. 
3.4. Cost and Profit Frontiers 
In a similar vein we can test the hypothesis that LL affects the cost process 
through both the position and shape of the cost frontier and the inefficiency term, 
therefore the following model arises:  
( )
( )
ln ln , ; ; ;
        ; ; ;
i LL LL i i
i LL LL i
tc f y p y v u
u g 
= + +
= +
i i
i
β β
z z δ δ                                  (9) 
 
Where ( )1,..., 0My y  be an output vector that requires total cost 0tc  given 
an vector of input prices ( )1,..., 0Np p  . Moreover, the alternative profit specification 
employs the same set of exogenous variables as the cost function in equation 9 with 
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the only difference that profit replaces cost as the dependent variable in the frontier 
regression. Therefore, the alternative profit frontier, companying with the inefficiency 
model, is given by  
( )
( )
ln ln , ; ; ;
        ; ; ;
i LL LL i i
i LL LL i
f y p y v u
u g


= + +
= +
i i
i
β β
z z δ δ                                  (10) 
 
where π is the profit of the bank and the other variables are as explained before 
 In that case the function ( );g iz δ is allowed to include interactions between 
exogenous factors iz  and outcomes yi  as well as between exogenous factors iz  and 
input prices pi  (Batesse and Broca, 1997). The incorporation of non-neutral effects of 
LL in the cost(profit) performance can be realized either through the consideration of 
LL as a factor that affects the cost(profit) frontier itself, or through the consideration 
of LL as a technical efficiency factor. In the former case, the ( );g iz δ  function for the 
thi− bank can be written as: 
( ), , , ; , ln ln lnQ Q Q QM Nn m LLi LL q qi qm qi i qn qi i LLq q LL
q q m q n q
g p y y z z y z p z y   = + + +   i i i qiz δ δ     (11) 
The last term of the right-hand part of equation (11) depicts the non-neutral 
effects of the LL on the inefficiency terms when they affect cost(profit) performance 
through the kernel of the stochastic cost(profit) frontier. In the case where LL are 
considered an inefficiency factor exhibiting non-neutral effects, the ( );g iz δ  function 
for the thi− bank can be written as: 
( ), , , ; , ln ln lnQ Q QN N MLL n LL q qi LL LL qn qi ni qn qi i mLL LLi mi
q q n q n m
g p y z z z y z p z y    = + + + +   i i i iz z δ δ        (12) 
 
The last term of the right-hand part of the above equation depicts the non-
neutral effects of the LL on the inefficiency terms when LL are an inefficiency factor. 
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The total effect of LL on the technical inefficiency of the thi− bank is the sum of the 
second and fourth term of the right-hand part of the above equation. Of course, 
combining equations (11) and (12) we can explore the case where non-neutral effects 
arise from both the LL as a factor that affects the total cost frontier as well as from LL 
as an inefficiency factor. Thus, the multifaceted character of LL, as regards cost and 
profit performance, may be based, in econometric terms, on the non-neutral effects 
that our model allows for.  
Most studies on the determinants of banks’ technical efficiency use data envelopment 
analysis (DEA) or stochastic frontier analysis (SFA). We use stochastic frontier 
analysis as it controls for measurement error and other random effects2 We use 
Battese and Coelli(1995) SFA model henceforth the BC model. that provides 
estimates of efficiency in a single step in which firm effects are directly influenced by 
a number of variables. A first advantage of the BC model over the standard two-step 
SFA approach of Aigner et al. (1977), and Meeusen and  van den Broeck (1977) is 
that the former estimates the cost frontier and the coefficients of the efficiency 
variables simultaneously3. Wang and Schmidt (2002) show that a two-step approach 
suffers from the assumption that the efficiency term is independent and identically 
half-normally distributed in the first step, while in the second step the efficiency terms 
are assumed to be normally distributed and dependent on the explanatory variables. 
This method inherently renders biased coefficients. A second advantage of the BC 
model is that it can be estimated for an unbalanced panel, which increases the amount 
 
2 Non-parametric techniques do not allow for measurement error and luck factors. 
These techniques attribute any deviation from the best practice bank to technical 
inefficiency. For a more extensive review of the non-parametric and the parametric 
approach, see Matousek and Taci (2004). 
3
 Kumbhakar and Lovell (2000) discuss other SFA models that also solve exogenous 
influences on efficiency simultaneously. Coelli (1996) has implemented the BC model 
into a statistical software package FRONTIER Version 4.1. 
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of observations. This study specifies the following stochastic translog cost function 
with three inputs and three outputs: 
2
0
2
1 1 1ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln ln
2 2 2
1
         ln ln  
2
n ni m mi n ni mm mi mi p ni ni mp mi ni T
m n m m n n m n
tm mi tn ni i it
m n
tc y p y y p p y p T
T T y T p u v
      
  
= + + + + + +
+ + + + +
    
 
    (13) 
where m= L,I,NI, and LL denote loans, investments, nοn-interest income and large 
lending respectively while n=L, C and F denote price of labor, price of capital and 
price of funding respectively,  tc represents the total cost of the i-th bank with 
subscript t suppressed, m  , n , mm , np , nmp , T , 2t , tm , tn  are the parameters 
to be estimated. Cost and input prices are normalized by the price of labor before 
taking logarithms to impose linear input price homogeneity. This scaling implies an 
estimation of coefficients for Cp (price of capital)  as well as Fp (price of funding) 
with the restriction that the sum of these coefficients is equal to one (see Kuenzle, 
2005).The alternative profit function uses essentially the same specification as the 
cost function, but with one change. The dependent variable for  the profit function 
replaces the logarithm of normalized total cost with  ln  , compared to the cost 
function, this the only change in specification, since the independent variables are 
identical to those in the cost function. The inefficiency term, of course, enters the 
frontier with a negative sign since now higher inefficiency is associated with lower 
profits as compared with best bank. As in the cost study, profit and input prices are 
normalized by the price of labor before taking logarithms to impose linear input price 
homogeneity.  
2.5. Testing Hypotheses Procedures 
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In order to provide a better illustration of our methodology, we devised figures 
1,2, and 3, with four vertical flowcharts. Each of the first three charts depicts each of 
the three hypotheses regarding the impact of large lending may bear on the three 
banks’ performance aspect (cost, profit and productive). More specifically: (i) it 
affects the deterministic part of the frontier, that is, the large lending operates as an 
“additional input” for the case of productive performance while it operates as 
“additional output” for the case of cost and profit performance; (ii) through the 
inefficiency term or in other words it has the character of an inefficiency factor; (iii) 
both ways. The final chart depicts the hypothesis that large lending has no effects. The 
full set of models that arise from these four distinct hypotheses for the case of cost, 
profit and productive performance is presented in the Fig 1,2, and 3 of the paper 
respectively.  
 To elaborate further, if we consider that large lending is an input (output for 
the case of cost and profit performance), the first vertical flow chart in figures 1,2  and 
3 denote that this may be approximated by an ECM specification (see model B) or 
under a TEEM specification. The TEEM specification may be modeled with neutral 
(see model D) or with non-neutral (see model G) effects of inefficiency terms. The 
second from the left vertical flow chart indicates that large lending acts as an 
inefficiency factor that can be approached by a TEEM model specification with 
neutral (see model E) or non-neutral (see model F) effects of inefficiency terms.    
Accordingly, the third vertical flow chart reveals that the impact of the adoption can 
be approximated by only a TEEM model with neutral (see model H) or non-neutral 
(see model I) effects of inefficiency terms. Finally, the last vertical flow chart assumes 
that large lending has nothing to do with the efficiency of firms. In that case, the ECM 
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(see model A) specification and the two versions of the TEEM (see models C and J) 
specification are the ones that should be estimated4.  
     As we can observe from the formulation of our models, they are nested and 
their differences are in the number of restrictions employed in their estimation. Thus, 
we can use the generalized likelihood ratio to decide which identification is the most 
appropriate and thus to reveal the role of large lending on banks’ cost, profit and 
productive efficiency.  
 
[Insert Figure 1 here] 
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4 In the context of the non-neutral TEEM modeling procedure, two alternatives arise.  The 
first alternative is the one which incorporates the non-neutral effects which are generated by 
the interaction of all the inputs (outputs in case of cost efficiency or profit efficiency) with 
all the inefficiency factors. The second alternative is the one which is restricted to the 
inclusion in the inefficiency model only of those terms which are generated by the 
interaction of only a subset of inputs (outputs in case of cost efficiency or profit efficiency) 
with the inefficiency factors. In the context of the present paper we have followed the 
second approach since the full version of the non-neutral TEEM approach incorporates 
thirty-two inefficiency factors and serious multicollinearity problems arise. Specifically, in 
all the cases where the modeling procedure considers LL an additional factor, the 
inefficiency model encompasses the non-neutral-effects of the Ex input (outputs in case of 
cost efficiency or profit efficiency)  with all the inefficiency factors.   
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4. Data and Variables Definition  
The financial and accounting data used in this study were obtained from SDI 
(Statistics on Depository Institutions) report made by FDIC (Federal Deposit 
Insurance Corporation). This report provides banks’ financial statements, ratios, types, 
ownership structure and information for USA banks. Therefore, it is the reference 
database for USA samples that both offers data on large and small business loans. In 
addition, SDI report is interested in what each bank considers a small business, so we 
can understand the full range of small business lending activity financed by banks. 
Rather than providing a definition, SDI report instead is asking each bank for its 
description of what it considers a small business. In this way, we will get a better 
sense of the differences in small business lending by different types of banks.  Our 
sample contains 7960 banks and tracked quarterly for the period 2010 -2017, creating 
an unbalanced panel of bank year observations. We adopt an intermediation approach 
(Berger and Humphrey, 1991; Ellinger and Neff, 1993; Altumbas et al., 2000; 
Rezvanian and Mehdian, 2002) to define the factor input and output of banks.  
For our estimations, we have three dependent variables, bank’s total output 
( )y , is the sum of loans, investments and non-interest income ,bank’s total cost ( )tc is 
the sum of labor cost, capital cost and funding cost while bank’s profit (π) is the pre-
tax operating income.  We specify as inputs, the salaries and employee benefits ( )Lx , 
the liabilities ( )lx , the total equity capital ( )Ex , and deposits ( )Dx of banks. Moreover, 
We specify as outputs, the total loans ( )Ly , the investments ( )Iy ,  and the non-
interest income  ( )Ny of banks. In addition, we include in translog cost function,the 
price of capital  ( )Cp derived as the ratio of operating expenses to net fixed assts, the 
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price of labor ( )Lp calculated as the ratio of employ salary to total employees and the 
price of funding ( )Fp determined as the ratio of interest payments to total liabilities. In 
the cases where the impact of LL on the deterministic part of the frontier is tested, and 
thus the LL is regarded as an additional input, the values of  LLx  are derived from the 
difference between commercial and industrial loans  minus commercial and industrial 
lending to small business divided by loans and lease financing receivables of the 
institution, including unearned income.  
The variables which are incorporated in the inefficiency model may be 
grouped in two categories. The first category encompasses variables which are 
determined by the CAMEL model and therefore they depict the financial health of the 
bank and consequently its overall economic strength. Beginning with the first 
acronym of CAMEL model we have constructed the variable ( )CAP ,    that 
represents bank’s capital adequacy and it is defined as the ratio of the sum of Tier 1 
(core) capital plus Tier 2 Risk-based capital divided by bank’s total assets. Also, we 
have used variables that reflects bank’s asset quality such as  ( 3)NPLS , which is 
defined as the ratio of total assets past due 30 through 89 days and still accruing 
interest to the bank's total assets  as well as the variable ( 3)NPLS ,   defined as the 
ratio of total assets past due 90 or more days and still accruing interest to the bank’s 
total assets. Moreover, we have created the management capability variable ( )MAN ,  
defined as the ratio of net operating income to total not interest expenses. In addition, 
the variable ( )ROA , net income after taxes and extraordinary items (annualized) as a 
percent of average total assets, reflects banks’ profitability while the last acronym of 
the CAMEL model includes the variable ( )LIQ that represents banks’ liquidity and it 
is defined as the ratio of loans and lease financing receivables of the institution, 
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including unearned income to total deposits. The second group of the inefficiency 
factors contains county-specific factors that expected to influence banks’ efficiency. 
In this category we have included the Herfindahl index variable ( )HHI ,  as a proxy 
for the structural market conditions that entails in each county. Ιn the same category 
of the inefficiency factors we have included the industry specific dummy variables 
( )COM , and ( )SAV . Especially, ( )COM , variable takes the value of 1 for 
commercial banks and 0 for savings banks. Similarly, ( )SAV , variable takes the value 
of 1 for savings banks and 0 for commercial banks. Table 1,2 and 3 provide 
descriptive statistics for all variables used in the estimation of the cost, profit and 
production frontier and the inefficiency model respectively. 
 
[Insert Table 1 here] 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
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5. Results and discussion 
5.1. Characteristics of the frontier and the inefficiency model 
All the models which are analytically presented in figures 1,2 and 3 have been 
estimated using Frontier 4.1 software (Coelli, 1996). It should be noted, that in all the 
estimated models the relevant tests indicate that the null hypothesis of no technical 
inefficiency effects ( )0 =  in the estimated production frontier is not accepted5.In 
addition, a range of specification tests was carried out for all the estimated frontiers 
aspects (cost, profit and production) including a test for the specification of the three 
frontiers aspects (cost, profit and production) as Cobb-Douglas (CRS).In all the cases 
the hypotheses that the functional form of three frontier aspects(cost, profit and 
production) is of the Cobb-Douglas type and that the technology exhibits Constant 
Returns to Scale were not accepted.  
Models D, F and C are nested to Model I΄, and simple likelihood ratio tests 
indicate that the last is superior in econometric terms in case of banks’ cost 
performance (Table 4). Thus, it can be argued that LL affects the banks' cost 
performance both through the position and shape of the frontier and the inefficiency 
term. Thus, and hereafter the discussion will be focused on the estimation results of 
Model I΄. Similarly, the same analysis conducted in the case of banks’ profit and 
productive performance (Table 5 and Table 6 respectively) concluding that Model I΄ 
is greater in econometrics terms and therefore the conversation will be focused on the 
estimation results of Model I΄. 
[Insert Table 4 here] 
 
5
 This test is carried out in the form of the likelihood ratio test. The critical value for testing 
the hypothesis 0 =  is derived from Kodde and Palm (1986) with degrees of freedom 
equal to the number of each time included inefficiency variables.  
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[Insert Table 5 here] 
[Insert Table 6 here] 
 
 
5.2 Cost Efficiency Results  
The estimates of the inefficiency model are summarized in the lower part of 
Table 7. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of the inefficiency factors are jointly 
zero is not accepted. Surprisingly, technical efficiency is negatively affected by the 
banks’ financial strength as it is captured by the variable of capital adequacy. This 
result does not confirm the argument that higher capitalization contributes to alleviate 
agency problems between managers and shareholders. Shareholders in this case have 
greater incentives to monitor managements performance and ensure that the banks are 
run efficiently (Eisenbeis et al., 1999). 
Similarly, non-performing loans past due 90 days or more affects negatively 
technical inefficiency contrary to financial theory that supports that non-value-added 
activities of bad assets incur a negative consequence on the operating performance 
(Tsai and Huang, 1999). In addition, market construction   seems to influence 
negatively banks’ technical inefficiency confirming the Efficient Structure 
Hypothesis, that most efficient banks are likely to survive competitive pressures and 
they will gain market share at the cost of less efficient banks (Demsetz, 1973).  
Finally, commercial banks firms are revealed to be more efficient compared to 
savings banks.  
5.3. The Impact of large lending on Cost Efficiency 
Regarding the impact of large lending on the banks’ cost performance, in 
model I΄, which as we have already mentioned is the one fitting best to the data, the 
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impact of large lending on banks’ total cost performance is traced in both the 
deterministic kernel of the stochastic frontier and the inefficiency model. 
Concerning the deterministic part of the model, it is evident that large lending  
influence the total cost since both the coefficient of the ( )LLy variable and   the 
coefficient of the ( )2LLy variable is negative. In addition, large lending affects 
negatively total cost when it interacts with non-interest income output and time trend 
variable which captures the technological change while it affects positively the total 
cost when it interacts with investments variable. The interaction of large lending with 
price of capital reveal a negative relationship between total cost and price of capital. 
Contrary, we notice a positive relationship between total cost and price of funding 
when large lending interacts with the price of funding.  Apparently, a non-monotonic 
performing between the large lending and the banks’ cost performance is in place. 
Further elaboration of this relationship is presented below in this section.  
Turning to the inefficiency model, large lending reduces   technical 
inefficiency when no non-neutral effects are taken into account. When the latter 
appear, we can identify the positive influence of large lending on the firms’ technical 
efficiency, when they are combined with the price of capital variable and the variable 
that represent bank’s investments and banks’ non-interest income. In contrast, the 
interaction of the large lending with the price of funding reveals a negative influence 
on the banks’ technical efficiency is rather expected. 
Finally, the interaction of large lending with non-performing loans past due 90 
or more days reveals the unexpected negative relationship between banks’ 
inefficiency and non-performing loans.   
[Insert Table 7 here] 
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5.4. Profit Efficiency Results 
As discussed earlier, it is important to look at the revenue side of bank 
operations. Accordingly, the estimates of profit efficiency are presented in Table 8.  
As in the cost case, we focus on model I΄. The null hypothesis that the coefficients of 
the inefficiency factors are jointly zero is not accepted. Τhe empirical results   
summarized in the lower part of Table 8 suggest that technical  efficiency is positively 
affected by the bank’s financial strength as it is captured by the non-performing loans 
variables. We find that non-performing loans have a positive relationship with banks 
profit inefficiency supporting the related literature that suggests that efficient banks 
are better at managing their credit risk (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). 
Moreover, capital ratio influences negatively profit inefficiency implying   that 
higher capital ratios are related with greater efficiency consisting with the argument 
that higher capitalization contributes to alleviate agency problems between managers 
and shareholders. Shareholders in this case have greater incentives to monitor 
managements performance and ensure that the banks are run efficiently (Eisenbeis et 
al., 1999). Finally, commercial banks firms are revealed to be more efficient 
compared to savings banks.  
5.5. The Impact of large lending on Profit Efficiency 
Starting with the kernel of the stochastic frontier we notice that large lending 
influence positively banks’ profits when interacts with   investments output and time 
trend variable which captures technological change while this relationship turns to 
negative when large lending interacts with total loans output. Moreover, the 
interaction of large lending with price of funding and price of capital do not reveal 
any statistically significant influence on banks’ profit.  Obviously, the relationship 
between large between large lending and the banks’ profit performance is not 
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monotonic. Additional amplification of this association is presented below in this 
section.  
As far as the inefficiency model, large lending reduces technical inefficiency 
when no non-neutral effects are taken into account. When the latter appear, we can 
identify the positive influence of large lending on the firms’ technical efficiency, 
when they are combined with total loans output and banks’ investments output. 
However, the interaction of the large lending with the price of capital and the price of 
funding seems to not alter the negative relationship between technical inefficiency and 
large lending. Similarly, the above relationship does not change when large lending 
interacts with non -interest income output. 
Moreover, we can identify the positive influence of large lending on the 
banks’ technical inefficiency, when they are combined with the non-performing loans 
past due 90 days variable. Thus, we can argue that  an poor asset quality are in general 
technical inefficiency increasing, as we have already seen above, in the case of large 
lending non-performing loans past due 90 days seems to not be affected by the ability 
of large lending to decrease banks credit risk alleviating the information asymmetry 
problems that arise during a loan procedure. In contrast, the interaction of large 
lending with market structure confirms the Efficient Structure Hypothesis that implies 
a negative relationship between banks’ inefficiency and market power while the 
interaction of large lending with industry specific variable show the expected negative 
association between commercial bank and banks’ inefficiency since this dummy 
capture banking technology that contains less credit risk.  
[Insert Table 8 here] 
 
5.6. Product Efficiency Results 
28 
 
  Based on model I΄ we explore banks technical efficiency in terms of product 
performance. The estimates of the inefficiency model summarized in Τable 9. The 
null hypothesis that the coefficients of the inefficiency factors are jointly zero is not 
accepted. Technical efficiency is positively affected by the bank’s financial strength 
as it captured by the variables of CAMEL model. Particularly, we find that non-
performing loans have a negative relationship with banks efficiency confirming that a 
large proportion of non-performing loans may signal that banks use fewer resources 
than usual in their credit evaluation and loans monitoring process (Karim et al 2010).         
Similarly, capital ratio influences negatively technical inefficiency implying   that 
higher capital ratios are related with greater efficiency consisting with the argument 
that higher capitalization contributes to alleviate agency problems between managers 
and shareholders (Eisenbeis et al., 1999).  In a similar vein, the cost to income ratio 
influence positively product inefficiency suggesting that a poorer management’s 
ability to control costs reduces cost inefficiency as higher expenses normally mean 
higher cost and vice versa. 
Surprisingly, the liquidity ratio affects negatively the cost inefficiency 
indicating that banks inefficiency reduces as liquidity risk increases. As Golin (2001) 
In addition, market construction seems to influence positively banks’ technical 
inefficiency confirming   the “quiet-life” effect, postulating that the greater the market 
power, the lower the effort of managers to maximize operating efficiency. (Berger and 
Hannan, 1998).  Finally, commercial banks firms are revealed to be more efficient 
compared to savings banks.  
 5.7. The Impact of large lending on Product Efficiency 
Concerning the kernel of the stochastic frontier, it is evident that large lending 
influences linearly the produced output since the coefficient of the ( )LLx  variable is 
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negative supporting the substitution hypothesis between bank credit and trade credit. 
In addition, large lending affects negatively the produced output when it interacts with 
liabilities input and total equity input while it affects positively the produced output 
when it interacts with labor input. Apparently, a non-monotonic performing between 
the large lending and the banks’ product performance is in place. Further elaboration 
of this relationship is presented below in this section.  
Regarding the inefficiency model, we notice that large lending reduces 
technical inefficiency when no non-neutral effects are taken into account. When the 
latter appear, we can identify the positive influence of large lending on the firms’ 
technical efficiency, when they are combined with labor input and total deposits input.  
  In contrast, the interaction of the large lending with banks’ liabilities input 
and total equity of capital input seems to not alter the negative relationship between 
technical inefficiency and large lending.  
In addition, we can identify the positive influence of large lending on the 
banks’ technical inefficiency, when large lending is combined with the non-
performing loan variable. Thus, we can argue that an poor asset quality in general are 
technical inefficiency increasing, as we have already seen above, in the case of the  
large lending non-performing loans  increase banks’ inefficiency as a large proportion 
of non-performing loans may signal that  banks use fewer resources than usual in their 
credit evaluation and loans monitoring process (Karim et al 2010). Similarly, the 
interaction of large lending with market structure confirms the “quiet-life” effect 
(Berger and Hannan, 1998). In addition, this relationship seems to alter when large 
lending interacts with capital adequacy variable implying that although banks use 
trade credit to reduce information asymmetry problems however it still contains credit 
risk.  
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Finally, the interaction of large lending with industry specific variable show 
the expected negative association between commercial bank and banks’ inefficiency 
since this dummy capture banking technology that contains less credit risk.  
 
[Insert Table 9 here] 
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6. Conclusions  
Large firms (opaque firms) is particularly important for banks since an 
important part of lending to these kinds of firms is transported to trade credit provided 
to financially constrained firms (smaller and less liquid firms). Consequently, large 
lending could improve banks’ technical efficiency significantly. Though the impact of 
large lending on banks’ technical efficiency is highly important, no studies have been 
carried out to examine this relation. The objective of this article is to provide 
empirical evidence of the effect of large lending on the banks’ technical efficiency for 
the three efficiency aspects (product, cost and profit) using a sample of USA banks 
during the period 2010-2017. We find a positive relationship between the investment 
in large lending and banks’ technical efficiency for all measures derived from the fact 
that the benefits associated to trade credit surpass the costs of banks’ credit risk. 
Further evidence supports the complements relationship between bank credit and 
trade credit, showing large lending enters positively and significantly in production 
function implying that banks provide credit to those firms that have been granted trade 
credit by suppliers. The findings also support the financial motive for trade credit. 
Actually, the use of large lending as output in cost function can decrease banks’ cost. 
In this sense, large lending might be used to alleviate banks’ credit risk, thus lowering 
operating costs and therefore enhancing bank profitability. However, we do not find 
evidence for the financial motive, when we focus on profit function as large lending 
does not enter significantly in our regression. 
These results show the important role of large lending as a determinant of 
banks’ technical efficiency and provide valuable insights     for academics and 
bankers since the results suggest that by increasing their investment in large lending 
banks    may enhance their technical efficiency. This article highlights the importance 
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of current assets management in the maximization of bank value and opens an 
important field for future research. However, this study is also relevant for other 
groups of stakeholders, such as central banks and policy makers since central banks 
play a key role in the monitor the banking system and policy makers, in view of the 
importance of large lending for banks’ technical efficiency, should enforce loan 
contracts to combat late payment in large lending. 
To finish, one possible limitation is that the study focuses on a period of 
economic recovery (2010-2017) for the USA banking system. From our point of view, 
the over-time robustness of the findings is interesting. It would be appropriate to 
replicate this study in a period of economic downturn, like the 2007 financial crises, 
when data are available, in order to compare the results and draw conclusions. Due to 
liquidity and financial constraints arising from the current financial crisis, the 
relations obtained could be different. Late payment or non- payment in commercial 
transactions has increased significantly and because of this the positive relation found 
between the investment in large lending, given that large lending transported to trade 
credit by larger firms, and banks’ technical efficiency could differ.  Therefore, this is 
an important step for future research. 
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Tables 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of cost frontier variables 
 
tc  Ly  Iy  Ny  LLy  Lp  Fp  Cp  CAP  3NPLS  9NPLS  HHI  COM  
Mean 13,990 376,626 526,095 5,307 0.048 65.07 0.007 0.298 0.108 0.007 1.649 0.029 0.911 
Std.Dev 21,710.93 656,599.6 880,307.3 
 
11,461 0.055 0.861 0.004 15.960 0.022 0.006 0.004 0.038 0.284 
Min 305 6032 16,665 8 0.000 16.36 0.0002 0.001 0.034 0.000 2.600 0.005 0 
Max 23,8367 7,718,297 
 
8,792,214 
 
203,291 0.874 
 
235.461 
 
0.032 50.070 
 
0.410 0.080 0.165 0.695 1 
 
 
Table 2. Descriptive statistics of profit frontier variables 
 

 Ly  Iy  Ny  LLy  Lp  Fp  Cp  CAP  3NPLS  9NPLS  HHI  COM  
Mean 7,047.533 
 
384,409.2 
 
540,272 5,567.803 
 
0.049 65.4655 
 
0.006 0.303 0.107 0.006 0.001 0.031 0.915 
Std.Dev 13,967.47 688,564.4 
 
920,396.4 12,499.04 
 
0.057 16.065 0.004 0.817 0.025 0.006 0.004 0.041 0.278 
Min 2 6,516 13,820 8 7.064 16.362 0.0002 0.001 0.023 5.035 2.594 0.005 0 
Max 195,996 
 
7,732,112 
 
8,792,214 
 
203,291 
 
0.874 235.461 
 
0.032 50.070 0.431 0.080 0.165 0.620 1 
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics of product frontier variables 
 
y  
Lx  lx  Nx  LLx  CAP  3NPLS  9NPLS  MANAG  ROA  LIQ  HHI  COM  
Mean 892,409 
 
504,004.3 61,188.64 
 
135643.3 
 
0.049 0.107 0.006 0.001 7.337 0.996 0.761 0.030 0.914 
Std.Dev 1,524,122 848,903.4 
 
111,714.7 
 
193,670.1 
 
0.056 0.025 0.006 0.004 67.093 0.509 0.180 0.040 0.279 
Min 22,736 14,590 1,625 1,013 7.064 0.023 5.035 2.594 0.292 0.002 0.060 0.005 0 
Max 16,592,708 8,503,653 
 
1,437,022 
 
2,817,174 
 
0.874 0.431 0.080 0.165 5,769 3.472 1.912 0.620 1 
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Table 4. Model selection decisions for cost frontier 
0H  hypothesis Restricted 
model 
Unrestricted 
model 
( )0L H  ( )1L H  λ No of 
restriction 
2
0.05X  Decision Preferable 
model 
LL affects the kernel of the 
frontier 
The ECM is a valid 
assumption 
(B) (D) 2311.2 2504.6  5 386.67 Not 
accepted 
(D) 
... 0caprat com = = =           
The neutral TEEM is a valid 
assumption 
(D) (G) 2504.6 2512.2  5 15.375 Not 
accepted 
(G) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
LL affects the inefficiency 
model 
(E) (F) 2476.4 2562.0  5 171.26 Not 
accepted 
(F) 
The neutral TEEM is  a 
valid assumption 
         
... 0
FLLL LLp
 = = =           
LL affects both the Kernel of 
the frontier and the 
inefficiency model  
(H) (I) 2504.8 2512.8  5 16.182 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
The neutral TEEM is a valid 
assumption 
         
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
LL doesn’t affect either the 
Kernel of the frontier or the 
inefficiency model 
(A) (C) 2259.6 2463.5  5 407.77 Not 
accepted 
(C) 
The ECM is a valid          
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assumption 
... 0caprat com = = =           
The neutral TEEM is a  
valid assumption 
( C) (J) 2463.5 4346.2  11 3765.4   Not 
accepted 
(J) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
Horizontal decisions (D) (I) 2504.6 2512.8  6 16.605 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
3_ _... 0LL npls LL com LL  = = = =           
3_ _... 0LL npls LL com LL  = = = =  (C) (I) 2463.5 2512.8  14 98.658 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =  (F) (I΄) 4562.1 2624.1  11 3875.5 Not 
accepted 
(I΄) 
... 0
FLLL LLp
 = = =  (I) (I΄) 2512.8 2624.4  5 223.12 Not 
accepted 
(I΄) 
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Table 5. Model selection decisions for profit frontier 
0H  hypothesis Restricted 
model 
Unrestricted 
model 
( )0L H  ( )1L H  λ No of 
restriction 
2
0.05X  Decision Preferable 
model 
LL affects the kernel of the 
frontier 
The ECM is a valid 
assumption 
(B) (D) No 
value 
-9300.3 5 5 No 
value 
Not 
accepted 
(D) 
... 0caprat com = = =           
The neutral TEEM is a valid 
assumption 
(D) (G) -9300.3 -9291.8  5 16.953 Not 
accepted 
(G) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
LL affects the inefficiency 
model 
(E) (F) -9314.0 -9252.5  5 112.94 Not 
accepted 
(F) 
The neutral TEEM is  a 
valid assumption 
         
... 0
FLLL LLp
 = = =           
LL affects both the Kernel of 
the frontier and the 
inefficiency model  
(H) (I) -9298.3 -9291.2  5 14.07 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
The neutral TEEM is a valid 
assumption 
         
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
LL doesn’t affect either the 
Kernel of the frontier or the 
inefficiency model 
(A) (C) No 
value 
-9315.2  5 No 
value 
Not 
accepted 
(C) 
The ECM is a valid 
assumption 
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... 0caprat com = = =           
The neutral TEEM is a  
valid assumption 
( C) (J) -9315.2 -9308.4  5 13.508 Not 
accepted 
(J) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
Horizontal decisions (D) (I) -9300.3 -9291.2  6 18.067 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
3_ _... 0LL npls LL com LL  = = = =           
3_ _... 0LL npls LL com LL  = = = =  (C) (I) -9315.2 -9291.2  14 47.918 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =  (F) (I΄) -9252.5 -92277  13 49.596 Not 
accepted 
(I΄) 
... 0
FLLL LLp
 = = =  (I) (I΄) -9291.2 -9227.7  5 127.08 Not 
accepted 
(I΄) 
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Table 6. Model selection decisions for production frontier 
0H  hypothesis Restricted 
model 
Unrestricted 
model 
( )0L H  ( )1L H  λ No of 
restriction 
2
0.05X  Decision Preferable 
model 
LL affects the kernel of the 
frontier 
The ECM is a valid 
assumption 
(B) (D) 11506 22831  8 22651 Not 
accepted 
(D) 
... 0caprat com = = =           
The neutral TEEM is a valid 
assumption 
(D) (G) 22831 22921  8 178.97 Not 
accepted 
(G) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
LL affects the inefficiency 
model 
(E) (F) 21429 21468  4 77.19 Not 
accepted 
(F) 
The neutral TEEM is  a 
valid assumption 
         
... 0
FLLL LLp
 = = =           
LL affects both the Kernel of 
the frontier and the 
inefficiency model  
(H) (I) 22843 22862  8 37.899 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
The neutral TEEM is a valid 
assumption 
         
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
LL doesn’t affect either the 
Kernel of the frontier or the 
inefficiency model 
(A) (C) 11472 22818  8 22691 Not 
accepted 
(C) 
The ECM is a valid 
assumption 
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... 0caprat com = = =           
The neutral TEEM is a  
valid assumption 
( C) (J) 22818 22833  8 30.535 Not 
accepted 
(J) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =           
Horizontal decisions (D) (I) 22831 22862  9 60.933 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
3_ _... 0LL npls LL com LL  = = = =           
3_ _... 0LL npls LL com LL  = = = =  (C) (I) 22818 22862  16 88.547 Not 
accepted 
(I) 
3_ _... 0npls LL com LL = = =  (F) (I΄) 21468 22940  15 2944.8 Not 
accepted 
(I΄) 
... 0
FLLL LLp
 = = =  (I) (I΄) 22862 22940  4 156.25 Not 
accepted 
(I΄) 
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Table 7. Maximum Likelihood Estimators for Models C, D, G, F and I΄ for cost frontiera 
 
Coef- 
Ficient 
Variable Model C  Model D  Model G Model F  Model I’ 
0  Constant  -1.605 
(-2.384) 
-1.570** 
(-2.059) 
-1.744** 
(-2.269) 
-1.862*** 
(-2.728) 
-1.942** 
(-2.368) 
L  ln(y )L  -0.608** 
(-3.336) 
-0.452** 
(-2.362) 
-0.459** 
(-2.366) 
-5.857*** 
(-3.189) 
-4.400** 
(-2.266) 
I  Iln(y )   1.440*** 
(6.932) 
1.344*** 
(6.276) 
1.377*** 
(6.341) 
1.428*** 
(6.845) 
1.304*** 
(5.948) 
N  ln(y )N   0.248*** 
(3.717) 
0.174** 
(2.501) 
0.162** 
(2.303) 
2.251*** 
(3.364) 
1.680** 
LL  ln LLy   - -0.017 
(-0.632) 
-0.045 
(-1.549) 
- -1.042*** 
(-3.340) 
Cp
  ln( )C
L
p
p   
-0.218*** 
(-3.425) 
-0.210*** 
(-3.152) 
-0.222*** 
(-3.287) 
-2.111*** 
(-3.109) 
-2.540*** 
(-3.435) 
Fp
  ln( )F
L
p
p   
0.838*** 
(9.186) 
0.879*** 
(8.828) 
0.885*** 
(8.763) 
7.787*** 
(8.263) 
7.802*** 
(7.217) 
2L
  2(ln )Ly   -0.099*** 
(-3.719) 
-0.113*** 
(-4.211) 
-0.116*** 
(-4.249) 
-1.079*** 
(-3.965) 
-1.404*** 
(-5.060) 
2I
  2I(ln )y   -0.213*** 
(-5.417) 
-0.198*** 
(-5.024) 
-0.208*** 
(-5.166) 
-2.184*** 
(-5.629) 
-2.081*** 
(-5.292) 
2N
  2(ln )Ny   0.077*** 
(18.085) 
0.078*** 
(18.633) 
-0.078*** 
(18.354) 
 
7.898*** 
(17.762) 
8.290*** 
(19.523) 
2LL
  2(ln )LLy   - -0.002*** 
(-3.988) 
-0.002*** 
(-4.214) 
- -1.232* 
(-1.687) 
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2Cp
  2(ln )C
L
p
p   
-0.071*** 
(-17.591) 
-0.071*** 
(-17.498) 
-0.071*** 
(-17.348) 
-6.703*** 
(-15.988) 
-6.462*** 
(-14.942) 
2
Fp
  2(ln )F
L
p
p   
0.100*** 
(11.690) 
0.105*** 
(12.025) 
0.105*** 
(12.047) 
1.154*** 
(12.432) 
1.186*** 
(12.485) 
LI  L I(ln )(ln )y y   0.197*** 
(6.647) 
0.196*** 
(6.621) 
0.202*** 
(6.683) 
2.050*** 
(6.911) 
2.207*** 
(7.364) 
LN  (ln )(ln )L Ny y   -0.070*** 
(-6.599) 
-0.059*** 
(-5.464) 
-0.060*** 
(-5.453) 
-7.324*** 
(-6.806) 
-5.895*** 
(-5.395) 
IN  I N(ln )(ln )y y   -0.007 
(-0.578) 
-0.017 
(-1.419) 
-0.015 
(-1.210) 
-3.283 
(-0.265) 
-2.318* 
(-1.827) 
LLL  (ln )(ln )LLLy y   - 0.009** 
(2.244) 
0.010** 
(2.281) 
- 3.843 
(0.790) 
LLI  (ln )(ln )ILLy y   - -0.003 
(-0.803) 
-0.002 
(-0.483) 
- 1.286** 
(2.233) 
LLN  (ln )(ln )NLLy y   - -0.006*** 
(-3.962) 
-0.006*** 
(-4.354) 
- -8.750*** 
(-5.233) 
C Fp p
  ln( )ln( )C F
L L
p p
p p   
0.010* 
(1.842) 
0.010* 
(1.919) 
0.010* 
(1.916) 
8.792 
(0.001) 
-6.379 
(-1.026) 
CLp
  ln(y )ln( )CL
L
p
p   
-0.024** 
(-2.141) 
-0.024* 
(-2.136) 
-0.022** 
(-1.966) 
-3.380*** 
(-2.802) 
-3.521*** 
(-2.918) 
FLp
  ln(y )ln( )FL
L
p
p   
0.025* 
(1.848) 
0.025* 
(1.919) 
0.027** 
(1.962) 
2.738** 
(1.999) 
3.388** 
(2.438) 
CIp
  ln(y )ln( )CI
L
p
p   
0.011 
(0.903) 
0.011 
(0.877) 
0.011 
(0.873) 
1.651 
(1.245) 
1.510 
(1.125) 
FIp
  ln(y )ln( )FI
L
p
p   
0.043*** 
(2.910) 
0.045*** 
(3.081) 
0.043*** 
(2.938) 
4.872*** 
(3.232) 
5.019*** 
(3.299) 
CNp
  ln(y )ln( )CN
L
p
p   
0.014*** 
(3.764) 
0.014*** 
(3.862) 
0.013*** 
(3.581) 
-4.513*** 
(3.162) 
1.325*** 
(3.315) 
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FNp
  ln(y )ln( )FN
L
p
p   
-0.045*** 
(-8.170) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.817) 
-0.050*** 
(-8.705) 
1.299*** 
(-7.426) 
-5.382*** 
(-8.667) 
CLLp
  ln( )ln( )CLL
L
py p   
- 0.0003 
(0.241) 
0.0003 
(0.222) 
- -1.293*** 
(-4.397) 
FLLp
  ln( )ln( )FLL
L
py p   
- 0.002 
(1.226) 
0.001 
(0.798) 
- 1.334*** 
(4.007) 
t  T   -0.050 
(-1.630) 
-0.040 
(-1.234) 
-0.038 
(-1.173) 
-4.580 
(-1.444) 
-5.179 
(-1.512) 
2t
  2T   -0.010*** 
(-6.973) 
-0.009*** 
(-6.605) 
-0.009*** 
(-6.374) 
-1.024*** 
(-6.923) 
-1.045*** 
(-6.712) 
tL  ln LT y        0.002 
(0.501) 
0.001 
(0.325) 
0.001 
(0.321) 
1.467 
(0.287) 
2.766 
(0.543) 
tI  ln IT y   -0.005 
(-1.037) 
-0.004 
(-0.854) 
-0.004 
(-0.852) 
-4.608 
(-0.827) 
-4.785 
(-0.860) 
tN  ln NT y   0.002 
(1.260) 
0.002 
(1.138) 
0.002 
(-1.140) 
2.150 
(1.072) 
1.062 
(0.524) 
tLL  ln LLT y    - -0.0001 
(-0.261) 
-0.0002 
(-0.399) 
- -1.021* 
(-0.136) 
Ctp
  Tln( )C
L
p
p   
0.002 
(1.230) 
0.002 
(1.296) 
0.002 
(1.256) 
4.045* 
(1.925) 
4.181** 
(1.971) 
Ftp
  Tln( )F
L
p
p   
-0.014*** 
(-5.083) 
-0.012*** 
(-4.511) 
-0.012*** 
(-4.401) 
-1.446 
(-5.093) 
-1.470*** 
(-5.047) 
Inefficiency Model 
0  Constant 0.124* 
(1.739) 
0.203*** 
(2.764) 
0.241*** 
(2.995) 
3.761*** 
(5.127) 
1.738 
(1.197) 
3npls  3NPLS   -0.101*** 
(-8.562) 
0.496*** 
(-8.320) 
-0.126*** 
(-7.464) 
-8.554*** 
(-10.270) 
-9.095*** 
(-8.231) 
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9npls  9NPLS   0.0002 
(0.093) 
0.0003 
(0.141) 
0.002 
(0.458) 
3.293 
(0.116) 
2.218 
(0.037) 
caprat  CAP   0.480*** 
(6.714) 
0.496*** 
(6.463) 
0.452*** 
(6.020) 
3.969*** 
(8.917) 
2.469*** 
(4.235) 
hhi  HHI    -0.071*** 
(-7.164) 
-0.063*** 
(-6.709) 
-0.037** 
(-2.284) 
-4.919*** 
(-6.265) 
-2.834* 
(-1.892) 
com  COM   -0.095*** 
(-4.515) 
-0.112*** 
(-5.119) 
-0.263*** 
(-4.878) 
-1.493 
(-6.277) 
-1.505*** 
(-3.606) 
LL  LLy  - - - 4.640 
(0.667) 
-1.511*** 
(-2.703) 
LLL  ln LLLy y  - - - -1.791** 
(-2.476) 
-7.422 
(-1.132) 
LLI  ln ILLy y  - - - 3.685*** 
(2.771) 
3.321*** 
(3.974) 
LLN  ln NLLy y  - - - 3.836 
(0.058) 
-5.552* 
(-1.825) 
CLLp
  ln( )CLL
L
py p  
- - - -2.803*** 
(-7.489) 
-2.898*** 
(-9.261) 
FLLp
  ln FLL
L
py p
     
- - - 4.264*** 
(7.326) 
3.368*** 
(10.148) 
3_npls LL  ( )( )3 ln LLNPLS y   - - -0.007*** 
(-2.947) 
- -8.546*** 
(-3.700) 
9_npls LL  ( )( )9 ln LLNPLS y   - - 0.0005 
(0.342) 
- 2.656 
(0.019) 
_caprat LL  ( )( )P ln LLCA y  - - -0.011 
(-1.176) 
- -2.119 
(-0.174) 
_hhi LL  ( )( )ln LLHHI y        - - 0.006* 
(1.799) 
- 1.336 
(0.395) 
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_com LL  ( )( )ln LLCOM y   - - -0.036*** 
(-3.590) 
- -1.379 
(-1.581) 
LogL  - 2463.521 2504,548 2512.236 2562.018 2624.41 
2  - 0.088*** 
(8.873) 
0.089*** 
(8.753) 
0.087*** 
(9.258) 
8.954*** 
(11.769) 
6.518*** 
  - 0.775*** 
(31.487) 
0.778*** 
(31.662) 
0.774*** 
(33.517) 
7.984*** 
(51.042) 
7.669*** 
Notes: (a) Numbers in parentheses are the ratios of estimated coefficients to their standard errors 
***Represent statistical significance at the 1% levels 
**Represent statistical significance at the 5% levels 
*Represent statistical significance at the 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
46 
 
Table 8. Maximum Likelihood Estimators for Models C, D, G, F and I΄ for profit frontiera 
 
Coef- 
Ficient 
Variable Model C Model D Model G Model F Model I’ 
0  Constant  -2.770** 
(-1.972) 
-1.307 
(-0.807) 
-1.145 
(-0.688) 
-0.419 
(-0.267) 
-0.335 
(-0.200) 
L  ln(y )L  1.557*** 
(3.957) 
1.025** 
(2.426) 
1.012** 
(2.426) 
1.449*** 
(3.535) 
1.058** 
(2.309) 
I  Iln(y )   -4.379 
(-0.974) 
-4.737 
(-0.100) 
-4.746 
(-0.100) 
-0.486 
(-1.034) 
-0.145 
(-0.284) 
N  ln(y )N   4.103*** 
(2.818) 
4.468*** 
(2.911) 
4.505*** 
(2.865) 
0.431*** 
(2.823) 
0.459*** 
(2.951) 
LL  ln LLy   - 1.263** 
(2.059) 
1.543** 
(2.375) 
- 0.011 
(0.192) 
Cp
  ln( )C
L
p
p   
7.259*** 
(4.882) 
7.460*** 
(4.674) 
7.593*** 
(4.801) 
0.803*** 
(5.143) 
0.786*** 
(4.991) 
Fp
  ln( )F
L
p
p   
9.726*** 
(4.991) 
1.081*** 
(5.067) 
1.081*** 
(5.097) 
1.170*** 
(1.650) 
1.168*** 
(5.442) 
2L
  2(ln )Ly   2 .466*** 
(4.327) 
2.807*** 
(5.319) 
2.850*** 
(4.920) 
0.272*** 
(4.563) 
0.300*** 
(5.226) 
2I
  2I(ln )y   3.866*** 
(4.952) 
3.666*** 
(4.974) 
3.698*** 
(4.636) 
0.403*** 
(5.034) 
0.390*** 
(4.763) 
2N
  2(ln )Ny   2.728*** 
(2.859) 
2.518*** 
(2.640) 
2.490** 
(2.512) 
0.026*** 
(2.726) 
0.023** 
(2.363) 
2LL
  2(ln )LLy   - 2.019 
(1.229) 
2.339 
(1.354) 
- 0.002 
(1.501) 
2Cp
  2(ln )C
L
p
p   
-6.496*** 
(-6.520) 
-6.462*** 
(-6.449) 
-6.456*** 
(-6.318) 
-0.064*** 
(-6.248) 
-0.064*** 
(-6.197) 
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2
Fp
  2(ln )F
L
p
p   
2.311 
(1.201) 
2.479 
(1.271) 
2.467*** 
(1.255) 
0.031* 
(1.650) 
0.028*** 
(1.463) 
LI  L I(ln )(ln )y y   -3.320*** 
(-5.499) 
-3.387*** 
(-6.117) 
-3.426*** 
(-5.609) 
-0.352*** 
(-5.619) 
-0.361*** 
(-5.885) 
LN  (ln )(ln )L Ny y   -7.247*** 
(-3.375) 
-7.457*** 
(-3.506) 
-7.488*** 
(-3.393) 
-0.072*** 
(-3.333) 
-0.071*** 
(-3.204) 
IN  I N(ln )(ln )y y   5.631** 
(2.291) 
6.185** 
(2.548) 
6.253** 
(2.458) 
0.058** 
(2.336) 
0.061** 
(2.407) 
LLL  (ln )(ln )LLLy y   - -3.906*** 
(-4.250) 
-4.053*** 
(-4.265) 
- -0.038*** 
(-4.042) 
LLI  (ln )(ln )ILLy y   - 2.794*** 
(2.703) 
2.716*** 
(2.537) 
- 0.030*** 
(2.929) 
LLN  (ln )(ln )NLLy y   - 2.146 
(0.655) 
2.953*** 
(0.853) 
- 0.001 
(0.601) 
C Fp p
  ln( )ln( )C F
L L
p p
p p   
1.097*** 
(8.391) 
1.111*** 
(8.442) 
1.1132*** 
(8.366) 
0.111*** 
(8.397) 
0.113*** 
(8.525) 
CLp
  ln(y )ln( )CL
L
p
p   
1.033*** 
(-4.179) 
-1.051*** 
(-4.268) 
-1.059*** 
(-4.144) 
-0.100 
(-3.996) 
-0.100*** 
(-3.911) 
FLp
  ln(y )ln( )FL
L
p
p   
5.099* 
(1.737) 
4.253 
(1.456) 
4.208 
(1.388) 
0.042 
(1.408) 
0.041 
(1.322) 
CIp
  ln(y )ln( )CI
L
p
p   
8.453*** 
(3.094) 
8.423*** 
(3.074) 
8.373** 
(2.986) 
0.078*** 
(2.825) 
0.077*** 
(2.725) 
FIp
  ln(y )ln( )FI
L
p
p   
-6.046** 
(-1.964) 
-6.131** 
(-1.992) 
-6.078* 
(-1.915) 
-0.062** 
(-1.979) 
-0.064** 
(-1.986) 
CNp
  ln(y )ln( )CN
L
p
p   
1.927** 
(2.045) 
2.122** 
(2.253) 
2.174** 
(2.236) 
0.019** 
(2.045) 
0.022** 
(2.346) 
FNp
  ln(y )ln( )FN
L
p
p   
1.938 
(1.566) 
2.393* 
(1.912) 
2.393* 
(1.862) 
0.024* 
(1.921) 
0.026** 
(2.122) 
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CLLp
  ln( )ln( )CLL
L
py p   
- -1.046 
(-0.254) 
-9.854 
(-0.234) 
- -0.005 
(-1.375) 
FLLp
  ln( )ln( )FLL
L
py p   
- 3.270 
(0.702) 
3.822 
(0.781) 
- -0.002 
(-0.476) 
t  T   1.576** 
(2.297) 
1.985*** 
(2.735) 
1.956*** 
(2.665) 
0.162** 
(2.375) 
0.194*** 
(2.668) 
2t
  2T   -1.596*** 
(-4.537) 
-1.556*** 
(-4.460) 
-1.562*** 
(-4.357) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.337) 
-0.015*** 
(-4.321) 
tL  ln LT y        3.091*** 
(2.821) 
3.225*** 
(2.956) 
3.245*** 
(2.852) 
0.029*** 
(2.613) 
0.030*** 
(2.716) 
tI  ln IT y   -1.996* 
(-1.665) 
-2.257* 
(-1.887) 
-2.254* 
(-1.801) 
-0.019 
(-1.627) 
-0.022* 
(-1.791) 
tN  ln NT y   -7.586* 
(-1.700) 
-7.960* 
(-1.807) 
-8.107* 
(-1.754) 
-0.005 
(-1.328) 
-0.006 
(-1.476) 
tLL  ln LLT y    - 2.794* 
(1.691) 
2.679 
(1.523) 
- 0.003* 
(1.939) 
Ctp
  Tln( )C
L
p
p   
1.977*** 
(4.360) 
2.027*** 
(4.487) 
2.030*** 
(4.343) 
0.018*** 
(4.165) 
0.019*** 
(4.155) 
Ftp
  Tln( )F
L
p
p   
3.245 
(0.525) 
4.378 
(0.710) 
4.263 
(0.669) 
0.003 
(0.634) 
0.003 
(0.619) 
Inefficiency Model 
0  Constant -7.966*** 
(-3.492) 
-7.146*** 
(-3.462) 
-6.044*** 
(-3.588) 
-41.391*** 
(-4.495) 
-31.280*** 
(-4.325) 
3npls  3NPLS   1.500*** 
(3.769) 
1.385*** 
(3.498) 
2.091*** 
(2.773) 
0.530*** 
(4.082) 
1.012*** 
(4.154) 
9npls  9NPLS   8.822*** 
(3.421) 
8.118*** 
(3.629) 
5.549*** 
(2.629) 
0.280*** 
(3.619) 
0.276*** 
(3.241) 
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caprat  CAP   -3.246*** 
(-3.534) 
-2.948*** 
(-3.559) 
-2.332*** 
(-3.313) 
-17.730*** 
(-4.791) 
-13.289*** 
(-4.470) 
hhi  HHI    5.871** 
(2.302) 
5.934** 
(2.563) 
-5.740*** 
(-2.577) 
0.725*** 
(4.430) 
-0.227 
(-1.029) 
com  COM   -2.050*** 
(-3.160) 
-1.878** 
(-3.257) 
-1.155*** 
(-3.122) 
-11.348 
(-4.326) 
-6.505*** 
(-5.943) 
LL  LLy  - - - -11.327*** 
(-5.250) 
-9.749*** 
(-4.922) 
LLL  ln LLLy y  - - - 0.423*** 
(4.803) 
0.233*** 
(4.624) 
LLI  ln ILLy y  - - - 0.007 
(0.162) 
0.153*** 
(3.615) 
LLN  ln NLLy y  - - - -0.007 
(-0.237) 
-0.040** 
(-2.520) 
CLLp
  ln( )CLL
L
py p  
- - - -0.298*** 
(-4.925) 
-0.237*** 
(-6.200) 
FLLp
  ln FLL
L
py p
     
- - - -0.542*** 
(-4.639) 
-0.499*** 
(-5.756) 
3_npls LL  ( )( )3 ln LLNPLS y   - - 2.393** 
(2.368) 
- 0.157*** 
(4.092) 
9_npls LL  ( )( )9 ln LLNPLS y   - - -2.307 
(-1.267) 
- 0.018 
(1.272) 
_caprat LL  ( )( )P ln LLCA y  - - 3.851* 
(1.683) 
- 0.150 
(1.378) 
_hhi LL  ( )( )ln LLHHI y        - - -2.788*** 
(-4.158) 
- -0.202*** 
(-3.723) 
_com LL  ( )( )ln LLCOM y   - - 9.556*** 
(3.991) 
- 0.544*** 
(3.565) 
LogL  - -9,315.193 -9,300.268 -9,291.791 -9,252.493 -9,227.695 
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2  - 2.495*** 
(3.342) 
2.264*** 
(3.318) 
1.890*** 
(5.444) 
12.946*** 
(3.130) 
9.941*** 
  - 8.748*** 
(1139.725) 
9.967*** 
(1013.579) 
9.961*** 
(1.023) 
0.994*** 
(0.001) 
0.992*** 
Notes: (a) Numbers in parentheses are the ratios of estimated coefficients to their standard errors 
***Represent statistical significance at the 1% levels 
**Represent statistical significance at the 5% levels 
*Represent statistical significance at the 10% levels, respectively 
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Table 9. Maximum Likelihood Estimators for Models C, D, G, F and I΄ for product frontiera 
Coef- 
Ficient 
Variable Model C  Model D  Model G Model F  Model I’ 
0  Constant  1.025*** 
(7.805) 
  
9.243*** 
(5.551) 
1.158*** 
(14.798) 
9.229*** 
(11.037) 
 
7.333*** 
(9.490) 
L  ln(x )L  9.150*** 
(24.423) 
9.441*** 
(15.729) 
7.160*** 
(18.598) 
6.351*** 
(15.049) 
9.211*** 
(24.693) 
l  ln(x )l   -1.684 
(-0.742) 
-2.340 
(-0.688) 
2.159*** 
(8.670) 
3.195*** 
(9.851) 
-4.267 
(-0.018) 
E  ln(x )E   2.015 
(1.081)   
5.303 
(0.257) 
-8.529 
(-0.577) 
7.744*** 
(3.108) 
-8.443 
(-0.064) 
D  ln(x )D   1.140*** 
(5.943) 
   
1.173*** 
(4.301) 
1.213*** 
(6.662) 
-3.089 
(-0.126) 
1.216*** 
(6.721) 
LL  ln LLx   -   -1.028** 
(-2.481) 
-1.312*** 
(14.798) 
- -5.306*** 
(-5.715) 
L  2(ln )Lx   4.059*** 
(3.122)   
3.707** 
(2.071) 
3.257*** 
(2.589) 
1.072*** 
(6.840) 
3.692*** 
(3.194) 
l  2(ln )lx   4.919*** 
(9.610)   
4.949*** 
(7.428) 
4.531*** 
(6.510) 
7.551*** 
(7.562) 
5.234*** 
(10.689) 
E  2(ln )Ex   1.513*** 
(10.244)   
1.501*** 
(8.128) 
1.564*** 
(8.764) 
-1.594 
(-0.794) 
1.590*** 
(10.743) 
D  2(ln )Dx   4.344*** 
(14.878)   
4.354*** 
(6.620) 
4.479*** 
(13.201) 
9.008* 
(1.776) 
4.685*** 
(16.338) 
LL  2(ln )LLx   -   -1.258 
(-0.754) 
-1.828 
(-1.643) 
- -1.162 
(-1.096) 
Ll  (ln )(ln )L lx x   -1.932*** 
(-2.663)   
-1.873* 
(-2.028) 
-1.702** 
(-2.046) 
-8.441*** 
(-7.277) 
-1.896*** 
(-2.742) 
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LE  (ln )(ln )L Ex x   -1.570*** 
(-3.290) 
 
   
-1.457*** 
(-2.608) 
-9.834*** 
(-2.662) 
-1.056** 
(-1.963) 
-1.253*** 
(-3.673) 
LD  (ln )(ln )L Dx x   -9.629* 
(-1.656)   
-9.355 
(-0.950) 
-8.012 
(-1.533) 
-3.273 
(-0.475) 
-1.088** 
(-2.120) 
lE  (ln )(ln )l Ex x   2.917 
(0.983)   
2.849 
(0.710) 
1.670 
(0.061) 
5.449 
(1.383) 
2.559 
(0.096) 
lD  (ln )(ln )l Dx x   -3.224*** 
(-8.475)   
-3.278*** 
(-7.941) 
-3.210*** 
(-5.954) 
-5.413 
(-0.944) 
-3.341*** 
(-9.098) 
ED  (ln )(ln )E Dx x   -1.522 
(-0.549)   
-1.601 
(-0.415) 
-4.405 
(-1.616) 
1.163 
(0.315) 
-1.976 
(-0.941) 
DLL  (ln )(ln )D LLx x   - 2.593 
(0.382) 
9.895 
(1.322) 
- 1.671 
(1.137) 
LLL  (ln )(ln )L LLx x   - 1.847* 
(1.849) 
3.463*** 
(2.986) 
- 2.586*** 
(9.104) 
lLL  (ln )(ln )l LLx x   - -3.310 
(-0.421) 
-2.766*** 
(-3.834) 
- -2.234*** 
(-12.512) 
ELL  (ln )(ln )E LLx x   - -9.930* 
(-1.782) 
-8.390* 
(-1.869) 
- -4.785*** 
(-4.574) 
t  T   -6.263 
(-1.218)   
-7.935 
(-1.644) 
-9.305* 
(-1.727) 
1.371** 
(2.232) 
-9.544*** 
(-3.039) 
tt  2T   2.212 
(1.254) 
2.081 
(0.599) 
3.305 
(1.413) 
4.793 
(1.239) 
2.982* 
(1.717) 
tL  ln LT x        1.470 
(0.947)   
1.600 
(1.497) 
1.884 
(1.174) 
-4.187** 
(-2.505) 
1.820* 
(2.010) 
tl  ln lT x   -2.050 
(-0.193)   
-1.585 
(-0.237) 
-2.248 
(-0.301) 
3.784 
(0.429) 
-7.390 
(-1.150) 
tE  ln ET x   -6.515 
(-1.003)   
-7.177 
(-1.519) 
-6.774 
(-1.571) 
1.039** 
(1.976) 
-3.941 
(-1.055) 
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tD  ln DT x   -1.509 
  (-0.260) 
-1.763 
(-0.232) 
-3.998 
(-0.430) 
2.583*** 
(2.585) 
 
-6.628 
(-0.126) 
tLL  ln LLT x    -   -1.549 
(-1.564) 
-1.456 
(-1.054) 
- -1.234 
(-1.390) 
Inefficiency Model 
0  Constant -1.409 
(1.223)   
1.319 
(0.966) 
4.363*** 
(2.190) 
2.302*** 
(21.003) 
-7.302*** 
(-4.326) 
3npls  3NPLS   -1.197*** 
(4.006)  
1.173*** 
(3.811) 
1.577** 
(2.341) 
2.600 
(0.518) 
1.304** 
(2.024) 
9npls  9NPLS   -1.568 
(0.098) 
9.874 
(0.059) 
1.191*** 
(3.265) 
1.058*** 
(4.072) 
9.779*** 
(2.748) 
roa  ROA  -2.310 
(-0.172) 
-3.096 
(-0.207) 
9.175 
(0.296) 
-1.631 
(-0.777) 
-5.078 
(-0.171) 
liq  LIQ  -3.201*** 
(-256.568) 
-3.198 
(-235.662) 
-3.229*** 
(-123.511) 
2.374*** 
(127.637) 
-3.206*** 
(-128.835) 
caprat  CAP  -7.465*** 
(-22.028)   
-7.428*** 
(-20.775) 
1.579*** 
(16.366) 
-7.793*** 
(-16.552) 
-6.202*** 
(-8.985) 
manag  MAN  7.394*** 
(1.212)   
7.370*** 
(5.766) 
9.189*** 
(3.436) 
1.229*** 
(7.210) 
7.922*** 
(3.040) 
hhi  HHI    1.240*** 
(3.313)   
1.142*** 
(2.914) 
3.502*** 
(3.784) 
2.531*** 
(6.649) 
4.092*** 
(4.724) 
com  COM   -4.452*** 
(1.661)   
-4.042*** 
(-3.522) 
-8.641*** 
(-3.429) 
4.833*** 
(2.584) 
-9.671*** 
(-3.827) 
LL  LLx  - - - -1.174*** 
(-2.910) 
-4.076*** 
(-4.454) 
LLLL  lnLL Lx x  - - - 6.116*** 
(5.257) 
 
2.854*** 
(10.604) 
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LLl  lnLL lx x  - - - -6.165*** 
(-7.903) 
-2.536*** 
(-13.996) 
LLE  lnLL Ex x  - - - -4.112 
(-0.896) 
-4.114*** 
(-4.245) 
LLD  lnLL Dx x  - - - 4.702 
(0.725) 
5.619*** 
(0.425) 
3_npls LL  ( )( )3 ln LLNPLS x   - - 1.402 
(0.873) 
- 3.295 
(0.219) 
9_npls LL  ( )( )9 ln LLNPLS x   - - 2.813*** (3.277) - 2.424
*** 
(2.864) 
_roa LL  ( )(ln )LLROA x  - - -3.874 
(-0.537) 
- -1.016 
(-0.144) 
_liq LL  ( )(ln )LLLIQ x  - - 2.790 
(0.475) 
- 4.179 
(0.757) 
_caprat LL  ( )( )P ln LLCA x  - - -3.643*** 
(-5.438) 
- 2.820* 
(1.672) 
_manag E  ( )( )ln LLMAN x   - - -2.669 
(-0.422) 
- 5.054 
(0.080) 
_hhi LL  ( )( )ln LLHHI x        - - 8.234*** 
(3.668) 
- 8.212*** 
(3.935) 
_com LL  ( )( )ln LLCOM x   - - -1.494*** 
(-2.683) 
- -1.475*** 
(-2.730) 
LogL  - 22817.55 22831.35 22714.3 21467.52 22939.95 
2  - 9.424*** 
(76.927) 
9.401*** 
(73.275) 
9.602*** 
(73.943) 
1.438*** 
(55.550) 
9.218*** 
(76.867)   - 6.833*** 
(10.085) 
5.838*** 
(9.912) 
2.575*** 
(59.634) 
5.287*** 
(27.326) 
3.294*** 
(1441.602) 
Notes: (a) Numbers in parentheses are the ratios of estimated coefficients to their standard errors 
***Represent statistical significance at the 1% levels 
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**Represent statistical significance at the 5% levels 
*Represent statistical significance at the 10% levels, respectively 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
56 
 
 
57 
 
 
58 
 
59 
 
References 
Adedeji, Abimbola, and Richard C. Stapleton. 1996. Leases, debt and taxable 
capacity. Applied Financial Economics 6.1, 71-83. 
 
Aebi, V., Sabato, G., & Schmid, M., 2012. Risk management, corporate governance, 
and bank performance in the financial crisis. Journal of Banking & Finance, 36(12), 
3213-3226. 
 
Aigner, D., Lovell, C. K., & Schmidt, P., 1977. Formulation and estimation of 
stochastic frontier production function models. Journal of econometrics, 6(1), 21-37. 
 
Allen,J., Rai, A., 1996. Operational efficiency in banking: an international 
comparison. Journal of Banking and Finance, 20, 665-672. 
 
Altunbas,Y.,Liu, M.H.,Molyneux, P.,Seth, R., 2000. Efficiency and risk in Japanese 
banking. Journal of Banking and Finnace. 24(10), 1605-1628.  
 
Ang, J., Peterson, P., 1984. The leasing puzzle. Journal of Finance 39 (4), 1055–65. 
 
Atanasova , C. and Wilson, N. 2001. Borrowing constraints and the demand for trade 
credit: Evidence for trade credit: Evidence from UK panel data. Mimeograph, Credit 
Managemnet Research Centre, University of Leeds.    
 
Bartholdy, J.and Mateus, C. 2008. Taxes and corporate debt policy: Evidence for 
unlisted firms of sixteen European countries. Working paper, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1098370.   
 
 
Battese, G.E., and Broca, S.S., 1997. Functional forms of stochastic frontier 
production functions and models for technical inefficiency effects: a comparative 
study for wheat farmers in Pakistan. Journal of Productivity Analysis 8,  395-414. 
 
Battese, G.E. Coelli, T., 1995. A model for technical inefficiency effects in a 
stochastic frontier production function for panel data. Empirical Economics 20,  325-
32. 
 
Berger, A. N., Hasan, I., & Zhou, M., 2009. Bank ownership and efficiency in China: 
What will happen in the world’s largest nation?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 33(1), 
113-130. 
 
Berger, Allen N., and Timothy H. Hannan., 1998. The efficiency cost of market 
power in the banking industry: A test of the “quiet life” and related hypotheses. 
Review of Economics and Statistics 80.3, 454-465 
 
Berger, A.N., and G.F. Udell, 1998. The economics of small business finance: The 
roles of private equity and debt markets in the financial growth cycle, Journal of 
Banking and Finance, 22,(6-8), 613-673. 
 
60 
 
Berger, A. N., & DeYoung, R., 1997. Problem loans and cost efficiency in 
commercial banks. Journal of Banking & Finance, 21(6), 849-870. 
 
Berger, Allen N., and David B. Humphrey. 1991. The dominance of inefficiencies 
over scale and product mix economies in banking. Journal of Monetary Economics 
28.1 , 117-148. 
 
Berlin, M., 2003. Trade credit: why do production firms act as financial 
intermediaries?. Business Review, (Q3), 21-28. 
 
Biais, B., & Gollier, C., 1997. Trade credit and credit rationing. The Review of 
Financial Studies, 10(4), 903-937. 
 
Boocock, G., & Wahab, I., 2001. The financing of small firms: different continents, 
the same problems?. 
 
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I., & Wachtel, P., 2005. Privatization matters: Bank efficiency in 
transition countries. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(8-9), 2155-2178. 
 
Boot, Arnoud WA., 2003. Restructuring in the banking industry with implications for 
Europe. EIB papers 8.1, 109-129 
 
Bowman, Robert G., 1980.Τhe debt equivalence of leases: An empirical investigation. 
Accounting Review, 237-253. 
 
Burkart, Mike, and Tore Ellingsen.,2002. In-kind finance. Financial Markets Group, 
London School of Economics, Discussion Paper 421. 
 
Carter, S., & Jones-Evans, D. (Eds.)., 2006. Enterprise and small business: Principles, 
practice and policy. Pearson Education. 
 
Cassar, G., 2004. The financing of business start-ups. Journal of business venturing, 
19(2), 261-283. 
 
Chortareas, Georgios E., Claudia Girardone, and Alexia Ventouri., 2012. Bank 
supervision, regulation, and efficiency: Evidence from the European Union. Journal of 
Financial Stability 8.4, 292-302. 
 
Coelli, Tim J., 1996. A Guide to FRONTIER Version 4.1: A Computer Program for 
Stochastic Frontier Production and Cost Function Estimation. Armidale, NSW, 
Australia: Department of Econometrics, University of New England. 
 
Cook, L. D., 1999. Trade credit and bank finance: Financing small firms in Russia. 
Journal of Business venturing, 14(5-6), 493-518. 
 
Cunningham, R.C., 2005. Trade credit and credit rationing in Canadian firms, 
Economic Analysis (EA) Research paper series catalogue no11ff0027MIE-No.036. 
 
61 
 
Deloof, Marc, Istvan Lagaert, and Ilse Verschueren., 2007. Leases and debt: 
complements or substitutes? Evidence from Belgian SMEs. Journal of Small Business 
Management 45.4: 491-500. 
 
Demsetz, H., 1973. Industry structure, market rivalry, and public policy. The Journal 
of Law and Economics, 16(1), 1-9. 
 
Edmiston, B., 2007. Forming ethical identities in early childhood play. Routledge. 
 
Eisenbeis, Robert Eisenbeis, Gary D. Ferrier, and Simon H. Kwan., 1999. "The 
informativeness of stochastic frontier and programming frontier efficiency scores: 
Cost efficiency and other measures of bank holding company performance. 
 
Elliehausen, G. and Walken, J., 1993. An empirical investigation into motives for 
demand for trade credit, Federal Reserve Board Stuff Study no.165 
 
Farrell, M.J., 1957. The Measurement of Productive Efficiency. Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society Series A, 1957, 120, 253-90. 
 
Faulkender, M., & Wang, R., 2006. Corporate financial policy and the value of cash. 
The Journal of Finance, 61(4), 1957-1990. 
 
Finucane, Thomas J., 1988. Some empirical evidence on the use of financial leases. 
Journal of Financial Research 11.4, 321-333. 
 
Gilligan, Michael J., 2004. Is there a broader-deeper trade-off in international 
multilateral agreements?. International Organization 58.3, 459-484. 
 
Golin, J., 2001. The Bank Credit Analysis Handbook: A Guide for Analysts, Bankers 
and Investors, John Wiley & Sons (Asia) Pre Ltd 
 
Howorth, C. A., 2001. Small firms' demand for finance: A research note. International 
Small Business Journal, 19(4), 78-86. 
 
Huang, C.J. Liu, J.T., 1994. Estimation of a non neutral stochastic frontier function, 
Journal of Productivity Analysis 15, 171-180. 
 
Jaffe, D. and Russel, T., 1976. Imperfect information, uncertainty, and credit 
rationing, Quarterly Journal of Economics 90 (4), 651-666.   
 
Karim, M. Z. A., Chan, S. G., & Hassan, S., 2010. Bank efficiency and non-
performing loans: Evidence from Malaysia and Singapore. Prague Economic Papers, 
2(1), 118-132.  
 
Keeton, W.R. ,1979. Equilibrium credit rationing. New York and London:Garland. 
 
Klein, Benjamin, Robert G. Crawford, and Armen A. Alchian., 1978. Vertical 
integration, appropriable rents, and the competitive contracting process. The journal 
of Law and Economics 21.2, 297-326. 
62 
 
 
Klemperer, Paul., 1995. Competition when consumers have switching costs: An 
overview with applications to industrial organization, macroeconomics, and 
international trade. The review of economic studies 62.4, 515-539. 
 
Kodde, D. A., & Palm, F. C., 1986. Wald criteria for jointly testing equality and 
inequality restrictions. Econometrica: journal of the Econometric Society, 1243-1248. 
 
Kohler, M., Briton, E. and Yates, T., 2000. Trade Credit and the monetary 
transmission mechanisms, Discussion Paper, Bank of England.    
 
Kosmidou, Kyriaki, Sailesh Tanna, and Fotios Pasiouras., 2005. Determinants of 
profitability of domestic UK commercial banks: panel evidence from the period 1995-
2002. Money Macro and Finance (MMF) Research Group Conference. Vol. 45. 
 
Krishnan, V. Sivarama, and R. Charles Moyer., 1994. Bankruptcy costs and the 
financial leasing decision. Financial Management, 31-42. 
 
Kuenzle, M., 2005. Cost Efficiency in Network Industries: Application of Stochastic 
Frontier Analysis. Universität Zurich. 
 
Kumbhakar  S. C., Knox Lovell,C. A.,  2000. Stochastic Frontier Analysis, 
Cambridge University Press. 
 
Lee, T. H., Liang, L. W., & Huang, B. Y., 2013. Do mergers improve the efficiency of 
banks in Taiwan?: evidence from stochastic frontier approach. The Journal of 
Developing Areas, 47(1), 395-416. 
 
Lensink, R., Meesters, A., & Naaborg, I., 2008. Bank efficiency and foreign 
ownership: Do good institutions matter?. Journal of Banking & Finance, 32(5), 834-
844. 
 
Lewellen, Wilbur G., Michael S. Long, and John J. McConnell., 1976. Asset leasing 
in competitive capital markets. The Journal of Finance 31.3,  787-798. 
 
Love,I. Preve, L. and Sarria-Allende, V.C., 2007. Trade credit and bank credit : 
Evidence from recent financial crises, Journal of Financial Economics,  83, (2), 453-
469.  
 
Matoušek, R., & Taci, A., 2004. Efficiency in banking: Empirical evidence from the 
Czech Republic. Economics of Planning, 37(3-4), 225-244. 
 
Meeusen, W., & van Den Broeck, J., 1977. Efficiency estimation from Cobb-Douglas 
production functions with composed error. International economic review, 435-444. 
 
Mian, S. L., & Smith Jr, C. W., 1992. Accounts receivable management policy: theory 
and evidence. The Journal of Finance, 47(1), 169-200. 
 
63 
 
Montgomery, H., Harimaya, K., & Takahashi, Y., 2014. Too big to succeed? Banking 
sector consolidation and efficiency. Journal of International Financial Markets, 
Institutions and Money, 32, 86-106. 
 
Myers, S., 1984. Presidential address: The capital structure puzzle, Journal of Finance, 
39(3), 575-92. 
 
Myers, S.C., and Majuf, N.S., 1984. Corporate financing and investment decisions 
when firms have information that investors do not have, Journal of Financial 
Economics, 13(2), 187-221. 
 
 
Neff, David L., et al., 1993. Measuring Inefficiencies of Individual Agricultural 
Banks. No. 1280-2016-102136.  
 
 
Ng CK, Smith JK, Smith RL, 1999. Evidence on the determinants of credit terms used 
in interfirm trade. Journal of Finance 54, 1109–1129 
 
Nilsen, J. H., 2002. Trade credit and the bank lending channel. Journal of Money, 
credit and Banking, 226-253. 
 
Pilloff, Steven J., and Stephen A. Rhoades., 2002. Structure and profitability in 
banking markets. Review of Industrial Organization 20.1,  81-98. 
 
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G., 1994. The benefits of lending relationships: 
Evidence from small business data. The journal of finance, 49(1), 3-37. 
 
Omo, M., 2000. Determinants of trade credit in the Japanese Manufacturing sector, 
Journal of the Japanese and International Economies, 15, 160-177.  
 
Petersen, M. A., & Rajan, R. G., 1997. Trade credit: theories and evidence. The 
review of financial studies, 10(3), 661-691. 
Rajan, R. and Zingales, L., 1995. What do we know about capital structure? Some 
evidence from international data, Journal of Finance, 50,  1421-1460.   
 
Rezvanian, Rasoul, and Seyed Mehdian., 2002. An examination of cost structure and 
production performance of commercial banks in Singapore. Journal of Banking & 
Finance 26.1, 79-98. 
 
Schwartz, R. A., 1974. An economic model of trade credit. Journal of financial and 
quantitative analysis, 9(4), 643-657. 
 
Semih Yildirim, H., and George C. Philippatos., 2007. Efficiency of banks: Recent 
evidence from the transition economies of Europe, 1993–2000. European Journal of 
Finance 13.2, 123-143. 
 
Sensarma, R., 2005. Cost and profit efficiency of Indian banks during 1986-2003: a 
stochastic frontier analysis. Economic and Political Weekly, 1198-1209. 
64 
 
 
Sharpe, Steven A., and Hien H. Nguyen., 1995. Capital market imperfections and the 
incentive to lease. Journal of Financial Economics 39.2-3, 271-294. 
 
Silva, T. C., Tabak, B. M., Cajueiro, D. O., & Dias, M. V. B., 2017. A comparison of 
DEA and SFA using micro-and macro-level perspectives: Efficiency of Chinese local 
banks. Physica A: Statistical Mechanics and its Applications, 469, 216-223. 
 
Smith, J. K., 1987. Trade credit and informational asymmetry, The Journal of 
Finance, 42, (4), 863-872. 
 
 
Stulz, RenéM, and Herb Johnson., 1958. An analysis of secured debt. Journal of 
financial Economics 14.4, 501-521. 
 
Stiglitz, J.H., and Weiss A., 1981. Credit rationing in markets with imperfect 
information, American Economic Review, 71, (3), 393-410. 
 
Tsai, D.H. and Huang, F.W., 1999. Management quality and bank efficiency: 
empirical evidence for Taiwanese banks, Management Review, Vol. 18, No. 3, pp.35–
55. 
 
Wang, H. J., & Schmidt, P., 2002. One-step and two-step estimation of the effects of 
exogenous variables on technical efficiency levels. journal of Productivity Analysis, 18(2), 
129-144. 
 
Wingborg, J., & Landstrom, H., 2000. Financial bootstrapping in small business: 
examining small business managers’ resource acquisition behaviour. Journal of 
Business Venturing, 16(1), 235-254 
 
 
Wu,W.,Rui,O.M. and Wu,C., 2011. Trade credit, cash holding and financial 
deepening: Evidence from a transition economy, Journal of Banking and Finance, 36, 
(11), 2668-2883.   
    
 
 
 
 
 
